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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kim J. Day appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor
under the age of sixteen. Mr. Day now appeals, and he asserts that he was denied his
right to due process because of a fatal variance between the charging document and
the jury instructions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
K.S., who was thirteen at the time of trial, is Mr. Day's stepdaughter. (Tr., p.132,
Ls.8-19.) Her mother, Kristy Day, was married to Mr. Day. (Tr., p.134, Ls.1-6.) K.S.
testified that in November or December, 2007, Mr. Day touched her "private parts" while
they were in the hot tub together. (Tr., p.135, Ls.1-13.) She and Mr. Day would play
"ice wars," which was, "when you take ice cubes into the hot tub and stick them down
each other's pants." (Tr., p.135, Ls.19-21.) K.S. testified that Mr. Day would try to put
ice down her bikini and that she would stick her hand down in his pants to put the ice
there. (Tr., p.137, L.14 - p.139, L.4.) Around Christmastime, K.S. told Mr. Day that she
no longer wanted to play the game, because Mr. Day had, "stuck his hands down my
pants and said that he lost the ice 'cause it had melted, and he felt around my private
parts." (Tr., p.143, Ls.5-7.) She also testified that on that same occasion, "I had stuck
the snowball down his pants, and he grabbed my - the elbow part of my arm and stuck
it further down," so that she felt his penis. (Tr., p.143, L.25 - p.144, L.5.) When she
told Mr. Day that she no longer wanted to play the game, according to K.S., he said,
"okay, just don't mention anything to your mom." (Tr., p.145, Ls.21-22.) K.S. never told
any adults about the alleged incidents until almost two years later. (Tr., p.155, Ls.8-15.)
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K.S.'s friend, S.P., testified that she had seen Mr. Day put ice down K.S.'s
swimming suit while in the hot tub. (Tr., p.162, Ls.5-24.) She also testified that she had
seen Mr. Day touch K.S.'s breasts in the hot tub. (Tr., p.163, Ls.22-24.)
Justin Dance, a detective with the Bingham County Sheriff's Office, testified next.
(Tr., p.167, Ls.8-12.) He was assigned to the case in October, 2010. (Tr., p.168, LS.1014.) During an interview with Mr. Day, Mr. Day confirmed that he and K.S. played the
"ice wars" game, and that his hand may have touched K.S.'s private parts while trying to
put snow down her swimming suit, but that any touching was accidental. (Tr., p.177,
L.1 - p.178, L.8.)

A redacted recording of this interview was played for the jury.

(Tr., p.193, Ls.13-14; Plaintiff's Exhibit D.) The State rested.
Mr. Day testified next. (Tr., p.203, Ls.16-19.) He testified that the kids came up
with the idea of the "ice wars," where "everybody would just cool everybody off by
throwing the ice on each other or a cup of ice water. But the implements of that game
were different depending on the age "cause if you were older, you had a better
advantage than you would if you were younger." (Tr., p.207. Ls.18-23.) Mr. Day denied
ever having put his hands down K.S.'s shirt or fondling her breasts. (Tr., p.210, LS.1719.) He also testified that the game was never sexual in nature. (Tr., p.211, Ls.8-17.)
Mr. Day also testified that he never had K.S. touch his penis. (Tr., p.214. LS.913.)

Mr. Day explained that he had cancer in his genitals and had experience a

"hardening of the varicose seal on my testicle," which would create, "a burning
sensation. If you were to touch my testicle on the front side of my testicle, I would have
an immense amount of pain," and he did not want anyone to touch his testicles.
(Tr., p.216, Ls.5-20.)

Mr. Day testified that he did not tell Detective Dance this

information because, "I was terrified. I had no idea what, what this would entail, and I'm
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a little bit familiar with the system." (Tr., p.219, Ls.1S-20.) Mr. Day's wife, Kristy Day,
testified during the State's rebuttal case that Mr. Day had never complained about this
pain, but the parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibit E, which indicated that
Mr. Day had a cyst. (Tr., p.232, Ls.3 - p.234, L.3.)
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of lewd conduct - the jury
was instructed that the State must prove, "the defendant, Kim J. Day, committed an act
or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the

body of {K.S.]." (Tr., p. 236, L.23 - p.237, L.1 (emphasis added).) No objection was
made to this instruction. (Tr., p.19S, L.20 - p.201, L.7.)
Mr. Day was found guilty.

(Tr., p.262, Ls.21-23.)

He then admitted to a

persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.264, Ls.19-20.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years determinate.

(Tr., p.295, Ls.6-S.)

Mr. Day appealed, and he asserts that the district court erred by improperly instructing
the jury on the elements of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen.
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ISSUE

Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of lewd
conduct?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The JUry On The Elements Of Lewd
Conduct

A.

Introduction
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of lewd conduct - the jury

was instructed that the State must prove, "the defendant, Kim J. Day, committed an act
or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the
body of [K.S.]." (Tr., p. 236, L.23 - p.237, L.1 (emphasis added).) Because Mr. Day
was only charged with manual-genital contact in the Information (R., pp.41-42), the
italicized language created a fatal variance.

It also incorrectly defined lewd conduct,

essentially allowing Mr. Day to be convicted of lewd conduct for an act that would not
constitute actual lewd conduct.

B.

The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of
Lewd Cond uct
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Day acknowledges that no objection was made to

this jury instruction. Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error. The Idaho
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error.
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).

Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must

demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2)
there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial
rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. Mr. Day meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Day's right to due process. Mr. Day
was charged only with lewd conduct committed by manual-genital contact. (Tr., p.125,
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Ls.6-17; R., pp.41-42.) However, the elements instruction expanded the acts for Mr.
Day could be found guilty by adding the phrase, "or any other lewd or lascivious act
upon or with the body of [K.S.]." The instruction thus added an additional means by
which the jury could have found Mr. Day guilty. "A trial court has the duty to properly
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case before it." Weinstein v. Prudential

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). The instructions to the jury must
match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is
alleged to have committed the crime charged.

State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147

(2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and
the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011). A fatal variance is a
due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v.

Chapa, 127 Idaho 786,790 (Ct. App. 1995). Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Day's
unwaived constitutional rights.
Further, the only other evidence of inappropriate conduct that the jury heard was
the allegation that Mr. Day had touched K.S.'s breasts.

And this conduct does not

amount to lewd conduct. The crime of lewd conduct with a minor specifically includes
several types of sexual contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact,
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact.
I.C. § 18-1508. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court
addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl constituted lewd
conduct. The Court held that it did not because the type of conduct included in the
phrase "including but not limited to" must be the conduct of a like or similar class or
character to the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. at 486-87.
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It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Day based
on conduct other than manual-genital contact. This type of activity is not only different
from that with which Mr. Day was originally charged, but is not conduct that constitutes
the type of crime charged. The only type of conduct for which Mr. Day could lawfully
have been convicted was manual-genital contact, even if the jury believed that he
engaged in other touching with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires.
Touching the breast area would not constitute the crime of lewd conduct. Thus, giving
this instruction violated Mr. Day's right to due process.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that he
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the
means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if
they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging
document.

State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011).

The jury instruction is in the

record, so there is no need for additional information outside the record. Further, there
is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a strategic decision, as
Mr. Day gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to
convict him on uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of lewd conduct.
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.

While the jury heard evidence of manual-genital contact, the jury also

heard evidence that Mr. Day had touched K.S.'s breasts. Regarding the manual-genital
conduct, Mr. Day testified that any touching was incidental touching that occurred while
playing the "ice wars" game.

The jury could have believed that Mr. Day had simply

inadvertently had manual genital contact but willfully touched K.S.'s breasts. Further,
the prosecutor, while discussing the elements of lewd conduct during closing argument,
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specifically argued, "S.P. told you that he stuck his hand inside [K.S.'s] bikini top and
touched her breast." (Tr., p.245, Ls.7-12.) The jury was left with the impression that it
could convict Mr. Day based upon the touching of K.S.'s breast.
Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Day's right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Day's
conviction must be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Day requests that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for
further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2012.

JUSTIN M.C1JR1TS\"
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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